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ESTIMATING WELFARE IMPACTS WHERE PROPERTY RIGHTS ARE 
CONTESTED: METHODOLOGICAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
HIGHLIGHTS 
 Inappropriate valuation format may seriously bias assessment of the welfare impacts of 
conservation 
 Estimating respondents’ Willingness To Accept compensations for foregoing their 
rights to forests better reflected the impacts of conservation than their Willingness To 
Pay  
 Secure local property rights to the forest may be more conducive to conservation 
than  state ownership 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Where rights over natural resources are contested, the effectiveness of conservation may be 
undermined and it can be difficult to estimate the welfare impacts of conservation restrictions 
on local people. In particular, researchers face the dilemma of estimating respondents’ 
Willingness To Pay (WTP) for rights to resources, or their Willingness To Accept (WTA) 
compensation for foregoing these rights. We conducted a discrete choice experiment with 
respondents living next to a new protected area in Madagascar, using a split-sample design to 
administer both WTP and WTA formats, followed by debriefing interviews. We first examined 
the differences in response patterns to the formats and their performance in our study context. 
We also used the two formats to elicit  respondents’ attitudes to conservation restrictions and 
property rights over forestlands. We found that the format affected the relative importance of 
different attributes: WTA respondents strongly favoured livelihood projects and secure tenure 
whereas neither attributes were significant for WTP respondents. The WTA format 
outperformed WTP format on three validity criteria: it was perceived to be more plausible and 
consequential; led to fewer protest responses; and was more appropriate given very low 
incomes. Seventy-three percent of respondents did not accept the legitimacy of state protection 
and strongly aspired to secure forest tenure. The use of a WTP format may thus be inappropriate 
even if respondents do not hold formal rights over resources. We conclude that estimating the 
opportunity costs of stopping de jure illegal activities is difficult and coercive conservation 
lacks procedural legitimacy and may not achieve full compensations. Our findings question the 
viability of the current conservation model and highlight the importance to conservation policy 
of locally legitimate property rights over forestlands. 
 
 
 Keywords: Discrete choice experiments; property rights; conservation policy; Willingness To 
Accept; Willingness To Pay  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
By forming and restoring soils, forests have underpinned agriculture worldwide (Sunderlin et 
al. 2005). The removal of forest cover provides access to fertile soils for millions of small 
farmers in the tropics, and has therefore supported their livelihoods for decades (ibid). In most 
low-income tropical countries, the conversion of natural forests to small scale swidden 
agriculture has been described as the main proximate cause of deforestation (van Rijnsoever et 
al. 2015) and primary forests continue to be used for swidden cultivation (Kim et al. 2015a). 
Small farmers often view swidden agriculture as a low labour, low capital, and risk minimising 
farming strategy promising greater flexibility than more intensive agricultural systems that 
require onerous investments and technical training (Nielsen et al. 2006, Scales 2014). Clearing 
forests for swidden agriculture may provide higher returns to local communities than leaving 
them standing (Godoy et al. 2000). Local people may therefore incur net welfare losses from 
conservation actions restricting forest clearance.  
Protected areas are seen as a major conservation tool for preserving biodiversity. The 
continuing habitat loss in the tropics has motivated their expansion and the setting of more 
stringent protection targets (Perrings et al. 2010). However, much of the protected area network 
in low-income countries is characterised by considerable confusion and dispute over property 
rights (White and Martin 2002). While governments have de jure ownership of forestlands in 
many tropical countries (commonly inherited from colonial regimes), they have often been 
unable to enforce these claims owing to complex factors including funding shortfalls, recurrent 
political instability and exceptionally high levels of corruption (Bruner et al. 2004). In addition, 
state ownership is often contested by indigenous communities who claim customary rights over 
forestlands through settlement (White and Martin 2002). Despite long-standing customary 
ownership rights, local communities may be completely excluded from forests, or devolved 
only the responsibility to manage forest resources (Dressler et al. 2010). Property rights to 
forestlands are clearly a key and contentious issue in forest conservation in many tropical 
countries.   
Ambiguous property rights also pose challenges to the ex-ante valuation of the welfare impacts 
of forest use restrictions. Researchers must choose between estimating respondents’ 
Willingness To Accept (WTA) compensations for forgoing access to a resource or their 
Willingness To Pay (WTP) to access the resource. While discrete choice experiments (DCE) 
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have been successfully used to value local people’s WTA compensations to reduce illegal 
hunting activities in Tanzania (Kaczan et al. 2013, Moro et al. 2013, Nielsen et al. 2014), asking 
WTA questions when respondents do not perceive any rights over the good being valued leads 
to biased results (Freeman 2003). Indeed, property rights are theorised to be the most important 
criterion determining the choice between WTP and WTA formats. In this paper we use property 
rights to mean a bundle of rights over forestlands as defined by Schlager and Ostrom (1992, 
p250-251, referring to access, withdrawal, management, exclusion and alienation rights). In 
practice, households may customarily perceive less than these full sets of rights and the reality 
often involves a complex operationalisation of these bundles of rights (e.g. Muttenzer 2006). 
The choice of WTA or WTP matters since they have consistently been found to be empirically 
different (Horowitz and McConnell 2002, Tunçel and Hammitt 2014). Standard Hicksian 
economic theory provides two explanations for the WTA-WTP disparity (Randall and Stoll 
1980). The first concerns the income effect: WTP is strictly limited by budget constraints while 
WTA is not. The second involves a closer examination of the theory of preferences and relates 
to the availability of substitutes for the good being valued (Hanemann 1999). The WTA-WTP 
disparity may also reflect limitations in the standard theory; prospect theory provides the most 
prominent alternative (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Prospect theory posits that people define 
gains and losses based on a reference point, normally the status quo, and losses measured 
relative to this reference point have greater subjective significance than gains. While the effect 
of the format on welfare estimates has been well demonstrated, the choice of format might also 
affect the sign and statistical significance of the attributes valued in a DCE survey – the nature 
of such differences being less researched. A handful of  DCE studies have designed the survey 
to allow respondents to trade both improvements and deterioration in the levels of attributes 
against the reference level, entitling them to both ‘buy’ or ‘sell’ the attributes (e.g. Hess 2008, 
Bateman et al. 2009, Lanz et al. 2010, Masiero and Hensher 2010, Glenk 2011). While such 
designs explicitly allow a measure of WTA-WTP ratio, they have not explicitly framed the 
valuation questions in terms of WTA and WTP, nor have they elicited whether the target 
population actually perceives a property right to the good being valued. By explicitly asking 
respondents to think in terms of receiving or paying money, and following up with debriefing 
questions, researchers may identify alternative explanations to the WTA-WTP disparity that 
have been to date less researched. The first aim of this paper is therefore to examine the 
differences in the patterns of responses between the WTA and WTP formats.  
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A second aim of this paper is to assess the performance of the two formats for estimating the 
welfare losses from forest conservation policy in low-income countries on three criteria that 
indicate validity (Rakotonarivo et al. 2016). The first two criteria comprise measures of content 
validity, i.e. whether the survey descriptions and questions are “conducive and sufficient to 
induce respondents to reveal valid stated values” (Bateman et al. 2002: 305).The first criterion 
concerns the way respondents’ perceive features of the survey. For example, whether 
respondents found the survey scenarios to be plausible or believed in the consequentiality of 
the survey (i.e. whether respondents care about the survey outcomes and view them as having 
real policy impact, see  Carson and Groves 2011, Vossler et al. 2012). Therefore, all else equal, 
the best format results in the fewest respondents with problematic perceptions of the survey. 
The second criterion concerns the level of protest responses, that is, refusals to trade-off 
different attributes due to a lack of compatibility between respondents’ beliefs and the given 
format. When property rights to forestlands (or other resources) are contested, respondents may 
have beliefs towards the policy that conflict with the selected format (Meyerhoff and Liebe 
2009). The third criterion pertains to budget constraints. Where restrictions on resource access 
have large welfare effects and where household incomes are close to survival levels, WTP may 
provide a biased estimate of the true welfare impacts because it is constrained by respondents’ 
ability to pay1. We evaluated the two formats against these three criteria using the DCE results, 
responses to six standardised debriefing questions (with all respondents) and qualitative 
debriefing interviews with a sub-sample of respondents. 
Our third aim is to use the DCE and subsequent debriefing interviews to investigate 
respondents’ attitudes to conservation restrictions (irrespective of the valuation format) and 
perceptions of property rights, and discuss the policy implications for REDD+ (Reducing 
Emissions from forest Degradation and Deforestation) policy. REDD+ is often involuntary for 
local people who may be coerced into accepting it (Corbera 2015). As such, REDD+ may lack 
legitimacy and undermine social justice (Corbera 2012, Martin et al. 2013). Strict enforcement 
of restrictions in such a context may also impose local welfare losses that may not be mitigated 
by proposed compensation schemes (Martin et al. 2013, Poudyal et al. 2016). Justice principles 
                                                          
1 Local people heavily rely on subsistence farming. If their stated WTP estimates are severely 
constrained by their monetary income, these estimates may not reflect the actual value for of the policy 
or good being valued. Yet, if they do not take income constraints into account, their stated values suffer 
from hypothetical bias, i.e. their stated preferences would differ from their actual behaviour under real 
economic circumstances. 
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enshrined in forest conservation policies in the tropics may not align with local perceptions of 
just and legitimate environmental management (Martin et al. 2014). In the next sections, we 
describe the study design and data analysis. Results are presented in section 4, followed by the 
discussion and conclusion in sections 5 and 6.  
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2 MATERIAL AND METHODS 
2.1 Study site 
Our study site is Ampahitra Fokontany2, in the south-west corner of the Ankeniheny - 
Zahamena corridor REDD+ project in Madagascar, where most farmers rely on swidden 
agriculture, and on collecting wild products for subsidence use and trade (including building 
materials, fibres, foods). These people are, in the main, extremely poor and highly vulnerable 
to economic or environmental shocks. The Corridor Ankeniheny-Zahamena Protected Area 
aims to reduce deforestation in the eastern region of Madagascar and has been regarded as one 
of the island’s top conservation priorities. It is the site of a pilot REDD+ project financed by 
the World Bank’s BioCarbon Fund. It encompasses one of the largest remaining blocks of 
rainforest in Madagascar (which spans 382,000 hectares) and was formally granted a category 
VI protected area status in April 2015 (Republic of Madagascar 2015). It is co-managed by the 
Ministry of Environment in Madagascar, Conservation International, and local community 
associations. Major pressures include expansion of agricultural lands through forest clearance 
as well as illegal logging and artisanal mining (Ratsimbazafy et al. 2011). The average annual 
deforestation rate in the region was estimated to be 0.63 percent over the period 1990-2005 
(Verified Carbon Standard 2013). 
In many regions in Madagascar, forestlands (particularly those outside protected areas or in 
newly established protected areas) are not de facto subject to well-defined formal property right 
regimes: local systems of customary tenure frequently mix with, and evolve in response to, 
formal state-claimed ownership (Muttenzer 2006). The Ankeniheny-Zahamena corridor was 
formally gazetted as a protected area in 2015. Before then, it was subject to successive waves 
of immigration mixing with well-established customary rights, and resulting in the emergence 
of new rules and property rights regimes, which are clearly misaligned with the formal property 
rights vested exclusively in the state. These customary regulations determine who has rights to 
clear the land and how, depending on whether the individual belongs to an indigenous lineage, 
longer established settlers or more recent migrants (Pollini et al. 2014). 
Tavy is the widely used term for swidden agriculture in Madagascar, it is a central livelihood 
strategy for many rural Malagasy farmers, it is an efficient and low-input agricultural technique 
                                                          
2 Lowest administrative unit in Madagascar 
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and represents a strategy to manage risks to food security amidst climatic hazards or market 
challenges (Harper 2002). Tavy also takes on an important cultural meaning: the slash and burn 
process is often accompanied by rituals and blessings (Hume 2006). Although rural people 
have long migrated to urban areas to seek alternative sources of income, the highly subsistence 
nature of many households, rapid population growth in rural areas, increased competition from 
immigration, as well as the very low adoption of alternative livelihood options still motivate 
most Malagasy farmers to clear new forests for agriculture (Kull 2004). 
Clearance of primary forest in the tavy system is known specifically as teviala and has been 
criminalized in Madagascar since the colonial period (1896-1960), during which tavy and all 
burning of land were strictly banned. State control over forest resources continued post-
independence, but was seen as illegitimate by rural communities possessing de facto access to 
forests based on customary rights (Antona et al. 2004). Tavy has often been viewed as a 
“necessary evil” by the Malagasy government (Kull 2004, p225): forest clearance has always 
been considered a threat to Madagascar’s unique biodiversity, however, the government 
recognised the necessity of fire (including teviala) to rural farmers’ subsistence. During the 
first republic (1960-1972) a system of tavy authorisations existed and the legislation was less 
repressive than the colonial period, although fire enforcement still reflected the previous 
colonial practices. Tavy legislation was relaxed further during the second republic under the 
“five-year plan” of the then President Ratsiraka (1975-1991) being characterised by a 
politically pragmatic tolerance instead of prescribing a complete ban (Kull 2004). Pasture fires 
and tavy permits (including teviala) were delivered by local authorities throughout Ratsiraka’s 
government, but in practice, the tavy permit system functioned imperfectly if at all. Most 
burners never sought a tavy permit, the actual number of fires outstripped the authorisations 
and the forest area cut and burned for agriculture was at least ten times greater because of the 
lack of funds and monitoring (Ramamonjisoa 2001). Even to this day, while the issuing of tavy 
authorisations officially ended in the mid-1990s (Kull 2004), and teviala is strictly prohibited 
on paper, the enforcement of the teviala ban is still weak (if not inexistent in many remote 
areas) and rural farmers continue to clear forests to expand their agricultural lands according 
to local norms (ibid). 
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2.2 Sampling and data collection 
Since no map or census of households was available, we worked with key informants at the 
fokontany level to construct a sketch map showing locations of all villages in the study area. 
We identified eight villages along the border of Ankeniheny-Zahamena corridor. We visited 
each village and carried out detailed mapping of the households ensuring that no isolated 
household was missed out. We identified in total 417 households residing within our study site 
across the eight villages. With the aim of interviewing a minimum of 200 households in total 
(at least 100 for each survey format), we randomly sampled at 65% allowing for replacement 
from each village (proportional random sampling) and surveyed 203 households in total. 
Surveyed households were randomly allocated one of the two DCE formats (WTA or WTP), 
resulting in a total of 102 WTA and 101 WTP responses. Of the sampled households who were 
approached for the survey, only two declined to be interviewed, and three withdrew from their 
interviews before completion. Heads of households (95% were male headed) were the main 
respondents but all available household members also attended the interview. The DCE surveys 
were piloted in three phases between February and June 2014 in nearby villages. The actual 
surveys were carried out from June to August 2014. 
The questionnaire comprised three sections: 1) Socio-economic characteristics of the 
household including education, household features, land holdings and characteristics, other 
household assets, and wealth indicators (such as food security); 2) the DCE survey; and 3) Six 
follow-up questions. The first four follow-up questions were measured on a five-point Likert 
scale and concerned the survey itself, relating to the first criterion that we set up to measure the 
performance of the formats: i) Trust in the payment vehicle, ii) Plausibility of the survey 
scenario, iii) Perceived consequentiality of the DCE survey, iv) Respondents’ stated perceived 
ability to negotiate compensations with the government. The last two measured respondents’ 
attitudes towards the policy, and are related to the second criterion: v) Perceptions of the 
benefits of forest protection, and vi) Belief in the legitimacy of forest conservation policy. 
These were measured on a binary (yes/no) scale. 
We also conducted in-depth qualitative debriefing interviews with a sub-sample of respondents 
(N=11 (11%) and 9 (9%) for the WTA and WTP formats respectively). Interviews took place 
the day after the questionnaire survey, and lasted from 30 to 90 minutes. Interviewees were 
purposefully recruited to represent the full range of DCE responses to both the WTA and WTP 
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surveys and the interview was aimed at understanding respondents’ motivations for their 
preferences as well as their thought processes. Similar inquiries have been carried out by a 
handful of environmental DCE studies, but hitherto have been confined to developed countries 
(e.g. Clark et al. 2000, Powe et al. 2005), mostly using focus group discussions. Although focus 
groups allow participants to deliberate with others, in our situation, where a very sensitive issue 
is at stake (illegal swidden agriculture), we felt that individual interviews were more 
appropriate and avoided the influence of other participants in a focus group setting. The number 
of interviewees was determined by data saturation, i.e. we progressively built up a 
representation of respondents’ views and perspectives until a point was reached when no new 
information was retrieved. Interviews were audio-recorded with respondents’ consent.  
2.3 Choice experiment design 
The WTA and WTP DCE surveys were both designed to measure ex-ante the welfare impacts 
of restricting forest clearance by examining the trade-offs local people would make between 
the right to clear forests for swidden agriculture, cash payment, and support for improved rice 
farming. The attributes and levels (table 1) were informed by three focus group discussions and 
pilot testing of the design with 50 respondents in a park-adjacent community. The DCE 
questionnaires3 were administered by a team of five enumerators who all held at least a 
bachelor’s degree. Although we aimed to use the same payment levels in both formats, 
extensive piloting showed that an acceptable level of trading off in each format necessitated 
that the payment levels in the WTP format are three times lower than those in the WTA format4. 
We are not therefore able to directly compare the magnitude of the WTA and WTP, but we are 
able to compare the relative attractiveness of the DCE attributes between the two formats and 
identify the socio-demographic and attitudinal variables driving respondents’ choices. 
For each format, we combined alternative levels of the attributes in choice tasks using an 
efficient design that seeks to minimize the standard error of the coefficients to be estimated 
(Scarpa and Rose 2008). The fractional factorial design was optimised for d-efficiency for the 
multinomial logit model using Ngene 1.1.1, and based on information on the signs of the 
                                                          
3 Full DCE survey questionnaires are presented in sumplementary information. 
4 Bateman et al. (2002: 390) also recommend using different payment levels because the WTA-WTP 
disparity reflects real and robust characteristics of people’s actual preferences 
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parameters obtained from the piloting. The design generated 12 choice tasks that were divided 
into two blocks; each respondent was presented with six choice tasks. Respondents were 
randomly assigned one of the two blocks in the experiment. The design with zero priors and 
adding the reference alternative had an ex-ante d-error of 0.04 and 0.07, and 0.003 and 0.002 
when evaluated ex-post for the WTA and WTP format respectively. 
Each choice task was composed of three alternatives including the reference level alternative 
(see figure 1, 2 and Appendix C). DCE surveys usually include a status quo option (or do 
nothing or opt out). However, in our case the status quo (households’ own current “levels” for 
each attribute) would vary enormously across respondents, and elucidating a status quo 
alternative would require respondents to reveal their current participation in (illegal) forest 
clearance. We therefore opted for a counterfactual where protection is totally lifted for the 
WTA format and where protection is strictly enforced for the WTP format. . Our study protocol 
was reviewed and approved by the University’s Ethics Review Committee. 
Table 1 here 
2.4 Valuation scenarios   
The background scenario of the WTA survey was presented to respondents as5: 
“Please consider a major foreign donor who would like to provide you with some development 
assistance such as support for improved rice cultivation technique. Such support specifically 
targets rice cultivation on hills and aims to maintain soil fertility…Next consider that the donor 
gives you other options and lets you choose between an array of development assistance. For 
instance, the donor also offers to give you some cash that you can invest in any alternative 
income generating activities of your choice. Such cash payment would be managed by an 
independent external institution which will provide you with savings accounts…. Next, please 
consider that the government would make it possible for you to get a permit to clear forests on 
one hectare of forestland. This would be new additional land, still very fertile on which you 
have a legal and enforceable title, this would be similar to the five-year plan of President 
Ratsiraka’s government (1975-1991) where teviala permits were formally granted to rural 
farmers. Please know that the forest clearance permit on one hectare is a one-off 
                                                          
5 The script is only an excerpt translated in English from Malagasy 
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opportunity…Next, please consider that the government would make it possible for you to get 
a permit to clear forests on an unlimited forestland (i.e. not limited to one hectare).  
So if you were offered the choice below (figure 1), which one would you choose? I.e. which one 
would be the best option for your livelihoods?” 
Figure 1 here 
Thus, in the WTA format, the reference level alternative is an open access scenario, whereas 
in the WTP format, it is a strict protection scenario. The WTP scenario was presented as 
follows: 
“Please consider that you will be given the opportunity to invest in improved rice farming 
which specifically targets rice cultivation on hills and aims to maintain soil fertility.... Next, 
please consider that you would also be able to buy a permit to clear one hectare of forestlands. 
This would be like new additional land, still very fertile for which you have a legal title. This 
would be similar to the five-year plan of President Ratsiraka’s government (1975-1991) where 
teviala permits were formally granted to rural farmers. Please know that the teviala permit on 
one hectare is a one-off opportunity. Note that you can pay only after harvest. But please we 
would like to kindly remind you to carefully consider whether you would be really able to afford 
the one you choose. Know that you would be paying the government through state agents, and 
the permit would be legal. Note that the Fokontany and independent stakeholders would also 
be involved to ensure transparency…. Next, please consider that the government would make 
it possible for you to buy a forest clearance permit on unlimited forestland (i.e. not limited to 
one hectare).  
So if you were offered the choice below (figure 2), which one would you choose? I.e. which one 
is the best option for your livelihoods?” 
Figure 2 here 
2.5 Data analysis 
2.5.1 Treatment of debriefing statements 
We conducted exploratory factor analyses on the six debriefing statements separately for the 
WTA and WTP samples. Factor analyses aimed to generate factor scores that represent the 
underlying constructs by condensing a large number of variables into a smaller set of latent 
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variables or factors (Thompson 2004). Results show that for both samples, the first four 
statements (trust in the payment vehicle, plausibility of the survey scenario, perceived 
consequentiality of the survey, perceived ability to negotiate compensations with the 
government) loaded highly on the same factor. The one-dimensional factor solutions explained 
44% and 42% of the total variance in the WTA and WTP samples respectively. These results 
are consistent with the first four statements measuring the same latent construct whereas 
perception of the benefits of forest protection and beliefs in the legitimacy of forest protection 
measure different constructs, relating more to the policy rather than the DCE survey. We 
therefore constructed an additive score for each respondent based on the first four statements 
related to the valuation scenarios, ranging from 4 to 20 (using the five-point scales). The score 
had a high level of internal consistency, as determined by a Cronbach's alpha of 0.70 and 0.71 
for the WTA and WTP samples respectively. A smaller score corresponds to more problematic 
perceptions of the survey scenarios. We used this score together with attitudes towards the 
benefits of forest protection, and belief in the legitimacy of state’s protection in the discrete 
choice models to explain preference heterogeneity. 
2.5.2 Analysis of the DCE data 
According to random utility theory (McFadden 1983), the utility of a choice is comprised of a 
deterministic component (V) and a stochastic component (ɛ), which can be modelled to follow 
a predetermined distribution. According to this framework, the utility function of an individual 
i facing a choice between two experimentally created alternatives and a reference level 
alternative can be described as:  
                                     𝑉(𝐴𝑆𝐶, 𝑋𝑛𝑖, 𝛽𝑘)  +  𝜀𝑛𝑖 if n=reference level alternative, otherwise,  
                                     𝑉(𝑋𝑛𝑖, 𝛽𝑘)  +  𝜀𝑛𝑖 
Where 𝑈𝑛𝑖 is the utility function for individual i, for alternative n. V is the observed indirect 
utility, which is a function of 𝑋𝑛𝑖, a vector of observable attributes  and associated fixed 
parameters 𝛽𝑘. We specify an alternative specific constant (ASC) for the reference level. We 
effect coded all the categorical coefficient utilities to avoid inherent problems associated with 
using dummy coding when including a fixed comparator in DCEs (Bech and Gyrd-Hansen 
2005). The sign and significance of ASC cannot be interpreted when variables are dummy 
coded as the ASC coefficient may be associated with the utility of the base levels instead of 
𝑈𝑛𝑖 =      (1) 
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representing the utility of the ASC per se. For the effect coded variables, the magnitude of the 
omitted base level is equal to the negative sum of the utility weights for the other estimated 
categories (Louviere et al. 2000). We therefore added a column representing the adjusted 
marginal utility gains from the base level for each of the effect-coded attributes in table 2 and 
4. 
The random parameters logit (RPL) model or mixed logit model allows utility coefficients to 
be random variables to reflect unobserved preference heterogeneity in a population. All 
parameters were assumed to be normally distributed across respondents. If there is statistically 
significant variation in preferences for a particular attribute, this shows up as a statistically 
significant parameter estimate for its standard deviation (representing the spread of preferences 
around the average respondent). The model presenting the best fit was selected as measured by 
improvements in McFadden’s pseudo-R2 and Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).  
While RPL models control for unobserved heterogeneity by assuming that each individual in 
the sample has a different set of utility parameters, they require researchers to choose a 
particular parametric form for the distribution of parameters and may be better suited to assess 
individual level heterogeneity (Colombo et al. 2009). Latent class models (LCM) capture 
preference heterogeneity by identifying a grouping of individuals with homogenous 
preferences and readily allow inclusion of observed measures such as socio-economic 
characteristics or attitudinal scales to condition group membership and explain the source of 
heterogeneity (Boxall and Adamowicz 2002). Investigating heterogeneity at the segment level 
would also be relevant to empirically test whether a typology fits a given dataset6. We estimated 
a LCM for each format and found that a 2-class model fitted the data from the two formats best 
according to AIC statistics and our judgement regarding the interpretability of the results. We 
used the additive score of perceptions of the survey (defined in 3.1) and the two other attitudinal 
statements as covariates explaining class membership of the LCM7. 
                                                          
6 Recent advances in the modelling of choice experiment data and software packages propose the use 
of random parameter latent class models to allow for an additional layer of unobserved taste 
heterogeneity within a latent class. However, such heavily parameterised models have been criticised 
as being less robust and may introduce a potentially confounding effect (Hensher et al. 2013).    
7 While attitudinal data may be endogenous to the choice data and not a genuine expression of 
fundamental attitudes (Provencher and Moore 2006), including them in the model allows a pragmatic 
check of which attitudes are associated with differences in the patterns of responses to the WTA and 
WTP formats. 
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Marginal WTP (MWTP) estimates were calculated as follows: 
𝑀𝑊𝑇𝑃 =  
𝛽𝑖
𝛽𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
                         (2) 
Where 𝛽𝑖 are the attribute coefficients and 𝛽𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 are the price coefficients. 
The standard errors and the 95% confidence intervals for these estimates are obtained by using 
the Delta method (Hensher et al. 2005). 
2.5.3 Analysis of the qualitative debriefing data 
Each interview was professionally transcribed for the purpose of theoretical thematic analysis, 
which is explicitly analyst-driven. We therefore used a coding scheme intended to generate 
themes or general patterns that answer our research questions (Braun and Clarke 2006). Codes 
and themes were constantly revised based on new insights from data analysis using Nvivo 10. 
We assigned each interviewee to one of the two segments identified for each format in the 
LCM analysis, based on the highest ex-post individual class membership probability (table 4). 
The interviewees’ characteristics are summarised in appendix 1  
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3 RESULTS 
3.1 Sample characteristics 
The two random samples differ significantly only with respect to self-reported literacy and 
ethnicity at the 10% significance level (Appendix B). The average official years of schooling 
(2 – 2.5 years) are, however, not significantly different between the two samples. In the WTA 
sample, Betsimisaraka, which is the indigenous and dominant ethnicity in the study site, 
account for 79% of the total whereas this share is 66% in the WTP sample. Due to the different 
distributions of ethnicity in the two samples, the ethnicity variable is included in our discrete 
choice models to separate the effect of valuation format from any ethnicity effect.  
3.2 Difference in response patterns to the WTA and WTP format 
We found that in both formats, the price coefficient had the expected sign: higher payments 
would significantly increase and decrease respondents’ utility in the WTA and WTP formats 
respectively (table 2). We cannot compare the size of marginal WTA and WTP estimates 
because of different payment levels in the two formats. In the WTA format respondents 
positively and significantly valued the rice project, yet in the WTP format respondents were 
indifferent to support for improved rice farming. WTA respondents strongly preferred to 
receive payments spread over ten years (compared to a lump sum and 20 years) whereas WTP 
respondents’ preferences for the instalment attributes did not suggest any significant patterns. 
WTA respondents preferred one hectare of forest clearance permit to a closed forest frontier 
whereas the WTP respondents appeared indifferent between one hectare teviala permit and a 
closed forest frontier scenario as well as between an open forest frontier and a closed forest 
frontier scenario. In the WTA sample, the ASC is negative and significant at 10% level 
indicating that households preferred a change compared with the fixed alternative of open 
forest frontier, ceteris paribus. The ASC representing the closed forest frontier with no payment 
and no support for improved rice farming is negative and highly significant in the WTP format, 
suggesting that moving away from the reference level of closed forest frontier scenario would 
increase the average households’ utility compared to alternative scenarios. The standard 
deviations of the cash as well as forest clearance attributes (one hectare of permit and closed 
forest frontier) were highly significant in both formats, this implies that there is significant 
heterogeneity in preferences for these attributes.  
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Table 2 here 
3.3 Validity of the two formats 
3.3.1 Criterion 1: Respondents’ perceptions of the surveys 
Respondents’ stated perceptions of the surveys are presented in figure 3. The two formats 
differed significantly only in the perceived plausibility of the survey scenarios and whether 
respondents viewed the survey outcomes as having real policy impact (Mann Whitney test, z-
value=-6.57, p<0.005 and z-value=-1.95, p=.061 respectively)8.  
In the qualitative debriefings, a WTP non-trader expressed very low beliefs in the survey 
scenarios, particularly, the likelihood of a forest clearance permit, given what he perceived as 
a burgeoning interest among conservationists and the international community in forest 
protection.  
Figure 3 here 
 
3.3.2 Criterion 2: Compatibility with respondents’ beliefs about property rights and 
legitimacy of state conservation 
For both formats, we labelled one of the two-latent classes “non-traders” because the response 
patterns (utility parameters and covariates explaining class membership) and the qualitative 
debriefings indicate that these households did not trade off the payments with support for 
improved rice farming and/or forest clearance permits (table 4). WTA non-traders (14%) 
significantly preferred an open forest frontier to strict protection but were indifferent to the 
payments while WTP non-traders (53%) were unwilling to pay for forest clearance permits; 
yet moving away from the closed forest frontier reference level alternative (ASC) to alternative 
scenarios would significantly increase their utility (table 4). WTA traders (86%) preferred 
secure rights to one hectare of teviala to a closed forest frontier. They also positively and highly 
                                                          
8 Mann-Whitney U tests for the effect of socio-economic characteristics of the households found that 
only prior experience with World Bank social safeguard projects (designed to compensate for the 
negative impacts of the Ankeniheny-Zahamena REDD+ project - See Poudyal et al. 2016) affect 
consequentiality beliefs: households who have received these projects have significantly higher belief 
in the consequentiality of the WTP survey (median Likert value = 4) than those who have not (median 
Likert value = 5) (z-value=-2.49, p=0.013). 
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valued the support for improved rice farming. Traders in the WTP sample (47%) stated positive 
willingness to pay for the improved rice project and for forest clearance permits (both on one 
hectare and unrestricted clearance). They also strongly favoured longer timeframe (20 years) 
to one lump sum payment. Conversely, WTP non-traders, appeared to be unwilling to trade-
off the payments with other attributes.  
The acceptability of each format was measured by the rate of refusal to trade off due to a lack 
of compatibility between the format and respondents’ beliefs in the legitimacy of state’s 
conservation policy. In both samples, membership of the non-trading class was associated with 
problematic perceptions of the survey. However, in the WTA sample, it was also driven by 
disbelief that forest protection would have positive impacts on their livelihoods (implying 
consideration of likely costs and benefits and a genuinely high WTA), whereas in the WTP 
sample, beliefs that state forest protection was illegitimate were more important (implying 
protest responses), as well as low food security and Betsimisaraka ethnicity. 
The sign of the one-hectare permit and open forest frontier utility coefficients (negative and 
highly significant relative to the baseline of closed forest frontier) (table 4) among the WTP 
non-traders seem to suggest a positive WTP for forest protection (or WTA compensations for 
weak or no protection enforcement). However, the qualitative evidence suggests that they are 
negatively affected by forest protection and their responses actually suggest a protest behaviour 
(i.e. rejection of the hypothetical scenario). These WTP non-traders experienced hardship from 
strict forest protection. Although they were not willing to pay for forest clearance permits, they 
claimed that the enforcement of strict forest protection, which would be materialised on the 
ground in the presence of armed law enforcement, would make their living much more 
precarious than the current enforcement levels. They also argued that they cared about forest 
protection but could not afford it. Non-traders in the WTA format shared similar rationales for 
their responses. Both WTP and WTA non-traders viewed forest clearance as a necessity amidst 
a declining standard of living and the ongoing influx of migrant smallholders.  
However, WTA and WTP non-traders’ accounts also differed in some areas. WTA non-traders 
(I2 and I69) claimed that the revenue they would get from clearing forests far outweighed the 
compensation levels (supporting the LCM evidence that these non-traders were considering 
                                                          
9 Interviewees’ identification, see Appendix A 
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costs and benefits, rather than protesting). They asserted that cash is fleeting and teviala is 
much more sustainable. Their accounts did not seem to allude to any objections to the survey 
scenarios, particularly trust in the cash donations or plausibility of the scenarios (though the 
LCM suggest this group are more likely to have problematic perceptions of these survey 
scenarios than WTA traders). Their preferences were instead anchored in the critical 
importance of new lands to their current households’ livelihoods and their future descendants. 
However, they expressed a lack of ability to negotiate compensations with the government. 
We don’t really have the choice, do we? We’ve never had the choice, so whatever the 
government decides, we will have to go with it, even if the government gives as little as 
600 Ariary [about US$ 0.2), we have no say, anyway, the government won’t listen to us 
locals hidden below the leaves.”  (I2, WTA) 
On the other hand, interviewees among the WTP non-traders (I14, I15, I16, I20) were strongly 
averse to paying for forest clearance rights, which they asserted as already theirs. They strongly 
objected to the state’s protection and claimed that they must not pay for something they have 
been protecting for years from recent settlers. They appear determined to assert their rights 
over forestlands: 
“The valuation exercise was very disturbing, because if I pay for something, that implies 
that I don’t own that thing yet, I cannot purchase what’s already mine. Asking me to pay 
is so illegitimate because I have protected these forest patches and my efforts involved 
lots of sacrifice.” (I15, WTP) 
Table 3 here 
Table 4 here 
 
3.3.3 Criterion 3: Budget constraints 
In addition to strong beliefs about their rights to forestlands, these WTP non-traders were also 
averse to paying for forest clearance that they saw as their subsistence livelihood. They claimed 
that asking local forest dwellers to pay for teviala is highly nonsensical and unrealistic because 
it ignores the very reasons for its practice (i.e. their poverty-stricken status). Instead of paying, 
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they argued that they should be provided with some livelihood support. WTP non-traders also 
claimed that the sale of forest clearance rights would likely favour those with higher purchasing 
power, mostly the non-Betsimisaraka migrants who have other non-agricultural sources of 
income.  
However, only one WTP non-trader specifically mentioned that their ability to pay was 
constrained by their income and risks. They also asserted that if they had the means to pay for 
the improved rice farming, they would rather invest money in buying fallow lands or additional 
labour. 
“You know that there are some good years and some bad years, so if ever we are unable 
to pay, the government will withdraw the permit and we will be left with nothing. Or 
could it be that the government will be more indulgent to such cases? I don’t think so, an 
agreement is an agreement….The support for the improved rice project is particularly 
very risky, we cannot simply risk starving for one whole year because we were too busy 
digging soils which will only yield meagre crops”. (I16, WTP).   
WTA traders were very receptive to the support for improved rice project and stated that they 
would invest the cash mostly in the improved agricultural techniques. While WTP traders were 
also willing to pay for the rice project, they seemed to face considerable budget constraints. 
“Since forest clearance will be strongly prohibited, we will have to adapt. There is no 
other way round using fertilisers and using improved techniques but we could not afford 
the payments.” (I13, WTP). 
Respondents’ average marginal WTP estimates (for the traders’ segment) for one hectare of 
forest clearance permit amount to 1.2 million MGA (~389 USD10), and represent about 136 per 
cent of households’ average income11 in the region. Such figures confirm the subsistence-
nature of swidden agricultural practices and the very low compatibility of the WTP format with 
low-income.  
                                                          
10 3080 MGA = 1 USD 
11 These income measures were computed for a randomly selected sub-sample of households in both 
the WTA and WTP samples (50 households in total). 
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3.4 Respondent’s perceptions of forest conservation policy 
Over 70% of all respondents did not believe that state policy of protecting forests was 
legitimate. In the qualitative interviews, WTA and WTP traders strongly aspire to secure legal 
tenure over forestlands. Both groups stated that strict forest protection would result in severe 
hardship among local forest dwellers. They also expressed a strong aversion to state protection 
claiming that the state is unable to enforce protection and they are too vulnerable to the state 
representatives’ manipulation. 
“I cannot imagine what would happen if this military protection becomes a reality. You 
surely know how gendarmes work, they will just impose whatever they want on us, and 
who are we to discuss or fight with them? They will always win, and they will restrict 
everything, they won’t even allow us to take firewood.” (I19, WTP) 
“The first thing that came to my mind was: will the state be able to protect these forests, 
with all its problems and its instability? You cannot rely on the state to do anything. Ever 
since I’ve lived here (25 years), our request to get a government-hired teacher has 
remained vain, our children cannot to go to school because parents cannot afford 
teachers’ fees.” (I8, WTA) 
Traders in both formats seem to care about forest protection and claimed that they want to 
“breed” their forests. Nonetheless, they aspired to have the freedom to choose the forests’ fate.  
“If only people have legitimate rights to own forest patches and protect them, life will be 
so much easier and conflicts with recent migrants will be reduced….But you can never 
predict what others think, I do intend to breed mine, but others may decide differently 
depending on their circumstances, as the saying goes: even if yams grow on the same 
valley and use the same nutrients, there will always be ugly yams.” I10, WTA 
However, while WTA traders (I1, I2-I5, I7-I11) only aspired to legal tenure on one hectare of 
forest clearance and feared a tragedy of the commons situation in an open access scenario, 
WTP traders were willing to secure rights not only for one hectare permit but also for an 
unrestricted access to forestlands; the act of paying for unlimited clearance rights made them 
assume that they would be able to exclude outsiders. A permit for one hectare would allow 
WTA respondents to exclude others and assert their rights over forestlands as opposed to 
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customary ownership which are often disputed by recent settlers. WTP traders (I12-I13, I17-
I19) were willing to pay for forest clearance permits to leave a legacy of natural forestlands 
with their future descendants. They however begrudged having to pay for these rights.  
“There is simply no way that we agree to relinquish our rights to these forestlands, it is 
out of the question. But if we really have to pay for our descendants, then we will pay, 
although we strongly feel that we should not have to pay because we protected these 
forests.” (I19, WTP)  
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4 DISCUSSION 
4.1 How do the patterns of responses differ between the WTA and WTP formats? 
We found that response patterns differ between the WTA and WTP formats. The WTA 
respondents strongly favoured support for the improved rice project and secure tenure for one 
hectare of forestlands relative to no support and closed forest frontier respectively, whereas the 
WTP respondents expressed no significant preferences for either the improved rice farming or 
teviala permits. Also, WTP respondents had surprisingly no preference for delaying payments 
whereas WTA respondents significantly preferred that the payments (cash donations) were 
spread over 10 years instead of a lump sum payment, due to a limited ability to invest cash for 
the future (Rakotonarivo 2016). While the WTP and WTA formats have been shown to affect 
the size of welfare estimates (e.g. Bateman et al. 2009, Lanz et al. 2010), this study has provided 
evidence that the valuation format can also affect the response patterns, i.e. the relative 
importance of different attributes. 
While we cannot rule out that the different response patterns observed between the WTP and 
WTP formats may be explained by severe budget constraints among the WTP respondents, and 
the use of much lower payment levels in the WTP format could have lessened the disparity. 
Nonetheless, the disparity may remain because of respondents’ strong disbeliefs in the 
legitimacy of state’s protection (as suggested by both the quantitative and qualitative 
debriefings). We also made significant efforts when developing the valuation scenarios to 
ensure that the rates of refusals to trade-off between the two formats are not an artefact of 
respondents’ low incomes. We instructed respondents in the WTP format that they could pay 
after harvest time (in cash or in baskets of rice) if they run short of cash. We also used WTP 
bids that are at least three times smaller than the WTA bids.  
4.2 Which format is best for estimating the welfare impacts of conservation? 
This study also aimed to assess the performance of the WTA and WTP formats in our study 
context on three criteria of validity: respondents’ perceptions of the survey itself; whether 
respondents were unwilling to trade off different attributes due to moral beliefs; and the effect 
of budget constraints. We found that the WTA format outperformed the WTP format on all 
three criteria. The WTA format elicited fewer problematic perceptions than the WTP. Only 
15% of the total WTA sample did not find it plausible that a donor genuinely interested in 
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development would donate cash whereas 50% of the WTP sample strongly disbelieved that the 
state would be selling forest clearance permits (figure 1). Similarly, 73% in the WTA sample 
viewed the survey outcomes as having real policy impact against 60% of the WTP sample.  
The WTP format resulted in higher rates of refusals to trade-off forest clearance permits with 
payments (53% against 14% in the WTA format) and this did not seem to be explicable simply 
by the payment levels: respondents’ disagreement with the legitimacy of forest protection was 
highly significant in explaining refusals to trade-off in the WTP survey (table 4) but not in the 
WTA survey. This is corroborated by the qualitative debriefings which suggest that some 
respondents considerably begrudged paying for forest clearance, because such payments would 
ignore their rights and past efforts to conserve the forest. 
Finally, the qualitative debriefings support the argument that the WTP format is problematic 
in our study context because respondents’ ability to pay is severely constrained. Forest 
protection results in large negative welfare impacts; teviala provides barely enough for 
subsistence living and its substitutability with money is critically low. The qualitative findings 
suggest that although respondents highly value forest conversion to agricultural lands, teviala 
may not produce much surplus, but has a high labour efficiency which cannot be easily 
monetised, that is, it produces agricultural crops with minimal drudgery compared to improved 
agricultural techniques (Pollini 2009, Scales 2014). Swidden agriculture has also many 
advantages that are not easily substitutable by other alternatives (such as irrigated paddy fields) 
(ibid). In effect, swidden agriculture allows households to minimize climatic risks (e.g. 
flooding or cyclones) associated with lowland agriculture while paddy fields require significant 
inputs of labour or capital (Pollini 2012). Given the very slow rate of technological change 
(agricultural intensification), it is likely that swidden agricultural practices will remain 
widespread in the coming years as long as convertible forestlands are available. 
Most stated preference surveys ask respondents their willingness to pay for a policy change, 
these are appropriate when respondents do not perceive any property rights over the good being 
valued, or when the value of the policy is likely to be small relative to their income (Freeman 
2003). However, our results suggest that even where de jure forest ownership rests with the 
government, suggesting that WTP should be estimated (Mitchell and Carson 1989), 
respondents may hold strong protest beliefs that conflict with the WTP format and researchers 
should thus also consider estimating WTA. In the literature, other arguments against the use of 
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the WTA format include the possibility of strategic behaviour and extremely high WTA 
estimates that are inconsistent with neoclassical preferences (e.g. The NOAA panel - see Arrow 
et al. 1993). However, the qualitative debriefings do not suggest any evidence of strategic 
considerations. Our study therefore suggests that the WTA format may outperform the WTP 
format in a rural developing country context, which emphasises the importance of at least 
considering both formats. While our findings hinge on three criteria that we have defined a 
priori, other criteria could have also been considered. Kim et al. (2015b) further suggest that 
where the WTA-WTP disparity genuinely reflects respondents’ underlying preferences, the 
choice of the correct welfare measure should be based on the likely explanations for the WTA-
WTP disparity (e.g. bounded rationality or value learning). 
4.3 What are respondents’ attitudes to conservation restrictions and property rights 
over forestlands? 
Finally, this study aimed to investigate respondents’ attitudes to conservation restrictions and 
property rights over forestlands. 73% objected to state protection, arguing that that they have 
been protecting forests by restricting, if not completely stopping, forest clearance. Most WTA 
traders (86% of the total sample) shared the WTP traders’ strongest aspiration, which is to 
secure their customary rights over forestlands. Since strict protection has only been recently 
enforced in the Ankeniheny-Zahamena corridor and forest clearance used to be the legitimate 
way to claim new resources and territory (Muttenzer 2006), the strong loss aversion exhibited 
by the WTA and WTP traders towards forestlands ownerships may not be unexpected. These 
results do not support other scholars’ interpretations that the WTA and WTP formats both 
accentuate feelings of loss aversion, but in different dimensions (Bateman et al. 2002). That is, 
that by explicitly asking respondents to think in terms of paying money, WTP prompts loss 
aversion behaviour in the dimension of money whereas WTA prompts thoughts related to loss 
aversion in the dimension of the good being valued. We found that both WTA and WTP traders 
are loss averse with regard to the same dimension, the good being valued, i.e. their rights to 
forestlands. The WTP households’ responses primarily reflected their beliefs about the 
legitimacy of the state’s conservation policy. 
The results indicate that the current model of coercive conservation (that is, REDD+ building 
upon protected area regimes in which clearing is strictly prohibited and forestlands are state-
owned assets) combined with the provision of compensations for the costs of restrictions may 
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not be viable. Since REDD+ is involuntary for most local people, coercive conservation lacks 
procedural legitimacy and may not achieve full compensation, since estimating the opportunity 
costs of stopping de jure illegal activities is difficult, and compensations may be poorly targeted 
or delivered. If local people perceive the state’s protection policy as illegitimate or unjust, they 
may resist conservation actions and engage in environmentally harmful behaviours (Milner-
Gulland and Rowcliffe 2007) or they may incur losses (such as the cultural values associated 
with teviala) that would not be mitigated by most common compensatory schemes 
(Rakotonarivo et al. 2017). Analyses of the REDD+ safeguard processes in the study site 
further showed that compensations were vulnerable to elite capture and failed to reach the most 
vulnerable or those who are most affected by the restrictions (Poudyal et al. 2016). Without a 
secure legal tenure, affected people were reluctant to self-identify as engaged in illegal natural 
resource use because of fear of sanctions and consequently missed out on compensations that 
were aimed at offsetting the economic displacement generated by the REDD+ project. 
An explicit recognition of customary rights may be more effective at slowing down 
deforestation than the current coercive conservation model embedded in REDD+ policy, 
especially given poor governance in many developing countries (e.g. Moyo et al. 2016). This 
could be achieved by establishing secure forestland tenure and enabling owners to exclude 
migrants and outsiders. Our study highlights the importance of locally legitimate property 
rights arrangements in REDD+ implementation or other market-based instruments (Lockie 
2013, Dokken et al. 2014, Sunderlin et al. 2014). As local communities may wish to continue 
some forest clearance (Godoy et al. 2000), conservation may then be negotiated with them, 
similar to the conservation contracts and agri-environment agreements used in many 
industrialised countries (e.g. Adams and Moon 2013). When property rights are explicit and 
locally perceived as legitimate, contract negotiations would provide room for local people to 
claim incentives (cash or in-kind) for conservation efforts. The voluntary and renewable nature 
of these agreements would help ensure that opportunity costs borne by some of the world’s 
poorest people are fully compensated.  
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
The patterns of responses to the WTA and WTP formats significantly differ. The WTA format 
is more suitable in our study context because it was perceived to be more plausible and 
consequential, it minimises the rates of refusal to trade off because of ethical beliefs, and it is 
not biased by severe budget constraints. Most respondents strongly aspired to secure tenure 
and argued that they have better capabilities to protect forests than the government. 
Respondents in both WTA and WTP formats were very reluctant to relinquish their rights over 
forestlands and more than 70% of respondents in both formats perceived the state’s 
conservation policy as illegitimate. Researchers using DCE in similar contexts should not 
simply use de jure property rights to determine which format to use. The choice of format may 
substantially affect welfare estimates, which attributes are significant, the level of problematic 
perceptions of the survey and willingness to trade off in the survey. An inappropriate valuation 
format may seriously compromise efforts to determine appropriate compensation levels for 
coercive conservation.  
Conservationists and REDD+ proponents should reconsider coercive models of conservation 
(even with compensation) where these align very poorly with local people’s beliefs about 
customary rights. Otherwise, the current conservation model (REDD+ building upon protected 
area regimes in which clearing is strictly prohibited and forestlands are state-owned assets) 
would risk harming local welfare, and undermining a very significant driver of conservation: 
local people with secure property rights to the forest. Local people’s inability to prevent 
migrants clearing the forest, due to their lack of formal tenure, as well as the difficulty of 
estimating the opportunity costs of preventing de jure illegal natural resource use and the 
resulting problem with delivering fair and legitimate compensations, all strengthen the case for 
an explicit recognition of customary rights. Such recognition might be achieved by the 
devolution of secure forestland tenure to local people accompanied by voluntary conservation 
contracts negotiated directly with forest owners.  
28 
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Figure 1: Example of choice card in the WTA format 
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Figure 2: Example of choice card in the WTP format  
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a. Trust in payment vehicle 
WTA 
“I trust that the independent institution would transparently and effectively 
manage the cash donation over time” 
WTP 
“If the government sold me a permit, I trust that the government would honor 
that permit forever.” 
b. Plausibility of the scenarios 
WTA “A donor genuinely interested in development would donate cash” 
WTP 
“The idea of the government selling me a permit to do teviala is plausible.” 
(likelihood of the state selling permit in the valuation exercise) 
c. Perceived consequentiality of 
the DCE survey 
“I believe that my responses will influence policy outcomes” 
d. Perceived ability to negotiate 
with the government 
“I believe that I would be able to negotiate compensations or other requests with the 
government”  
e. Perception of the benefits of 
forest protection 
“Forest protection provides benefits which are important to my livelihood”  
f. Belief in the legitimacy of 
state’s conservation policy 
In your opinion, which forest management policy is more legitimate: 1) You do not have 
the rights to forestlands and pay to be able to do teviala, that is state protection is 
legitimate) 2) You do have the rights and need to be paid not to do teviala, i.e. state’s 
protection is not legitimate) (1= State’s protection is legitimate; 0= State’s protection is 
not legitimate) 
Figure 3: Diverging stacked bar charts of the follow-up attitudinal data - - Statements a. b, c, d are based on 
a five-point Likert scale: 1=‘strongly disagree’, 2=‘disagree’, 3= ‘neither disagree nor agree’, 4=‘agree’, 
5=‘strongly agree’ Statement e and f are based on a binary question (1=Yes, 0=No).  
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Table 1: Attributes and levels of the DCE (reference levels in bold) 
Attributes Description Levels Coding 
WTA format: Total cash 
donations framed as 
development assistance (3080 
MGA = 1 USD) 
Cash donations framed as development assistance that the 
household would receive. 
0, 3, 6, 9, 12, 15 (x106 MGA) Continuous 
variable 
WTP format: Total cash 
payments made to the 
government  
Cash payments that would give individual households 
forest clearance permits (similar to the “five-year plan” of 
then President Ratsiraka) 
0, 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 3 (x106 MGA) Continuous 
variable 
Number of annual instalments 
over which the household will 
receive / pay the total 
payments 
The three levels of instalments allow a pragmatic 
estimation of the respondents’ discount rates and provides 
information on the respondents’ ability to invest money.   
1, 10,20 Effect-coded 
Support for improved rice 
farming 
This attribute was introduced as a sustainable and modern 
agricultural package that includes productivity enhancing 
practices such as the use of fertilisers, insecticides and/or 
herbicides.  
No support, Support Effect-coded 
Teviala (clearance of new 
forestlands for agriculture) 
This attribute has three levels: i) no teviala (i.e. closed 
forest frontier), ii) a permit for one hectare of teviala (a one-
off opportunity), iii) free teviala (similar to pre-colonial 
times before criminalization of teviala and, de facto, to 
more recent periods of little or no enforcement).  
Free teviala , 1ha of teviala 
permit, and no teviala  or closed 
forest frontier 
Effect-coded 
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Table 2: Random parameters logit model (RPL) results. Mean effects show the effects on utility for 
discrete changes in each attribute for the average respondent away from the same baselines of no cash 
donation, no improved rice project, and closed forest frontier. Standard deviation parameters show the 
spread in preferences around this mean effect for each attribute and level change. All parameters are set 
as random with a normal distribution. 
 
 
 
  
 WTA  WTP  
Coefficient Standard 
error 
Adja Coefficient Standard 
error 
Adja 
  Random parameters  
Total cash donations (WTA) or 
payments (WTP) 0.08*** 0.03 
 
-1.78*** 0.31 
 
Instalment = 10 years 0.68** 0.31 1.35 0.47 0.26 0.82 
Instalment = 20 years 0.39 0.31 1.26 -0.10 0.27 0.26 
Improved rice farming 0.87*** 0.16 1.74 0.09 0.17 0.19 
Permit 1ha 1.31*** 0.39 2.63 -0.36 0.33 -1.68 
Open forest frontier 0.01 0.66 1.33 -0.95 0.56 -2.27 
ASC (reference level alternative) -0.75* 0.36  -1.35*** 0.45  
  Standard deviation estimates  
Stdev Total cash donations 0.10** 0.03  1.77*** 0.25  
Stdev Instalment = 10 years 0.81 0.50  0.14 0.77  
Stdev Instalment = 20 years 0.83* 0.43  0.22 0.74  
Stdev Improved rice farming 0.71*** 0.18  0.22 0.74  
StDev Permit 1ha 1.33*** 0.44  0.47*** 0.14  
Stdev open forest frontier 2.73*** 0.39  0.82** 0.42  
Stdev ASC 1.83*** 0.38  1.67*** 0.45  
Log-likelihood -446.07  -498.85  
McFadden’s pseudo R2 .31  .25  
AIC/n 1.56  1.69  
Nobs 612 (N=102)  606 (N=101)  
 
Note: ***, **, *   Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
a Adjusted marginal utility gains from the base level situation for the effect-coded attributes. 
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Table 3: Covariates used in the latent class models 
Variables Description 
 Summary statistics 
 WTA (N= 102) WTP (N= 101) 
Food security 
Numeric variable indicating the number of months a 
household has sufficient food for two good meals per day. 
Mean 
Std. dev 
Median 
5 
5 
3 
6 
6 
3 
Ethnicity 
Binary variable indicating whether the household head is 
betsimisaraka (the dominant and indigenous ethnic group in 
the study site) [0=NO; 1=YES] 
YES 81 (79%) 67 (66%) 
Perception score 
(from the factor 
analysis in 4.1) 
Additive score measuring perceptions of the survey scenario 
ranging from 4 to 20 (using the five point scales) (A smaller 
score corresponds to more problematic perceptions. 
Mean 
Std. dev 
Median 
13 
3 
13 
11 
3 
12 
Perceptions of the 
ecological benefits of 
forest protection 
Binary variable indicating whether the household perceives 
any ecological benefits from forest protection [0=NO; 
1=YES] 
YES 
(missing) 
63 (38%) 
7 
56 (55%) 
4 
Belief in the 
legitimacy of state’s 
protection 
Binary variable indicating whether the household believes 
that the state’s protection is legitimate [0=NO; 1=YES] 
YES 
(missing) 
30 (29%) 
3 
23 (23%) 
2 
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Table 4: Latent class models. Mean effects show the effects on utility for discrete changes in each attribute for the average respondent away from the same 
baselines in table 2 
  
WTA   WTP   
Segment 1:  Segment 2:  Segment 1:  Segment 2:  
“Non-traders” “Traders” “Non-traders” “Traders” 
Coef. s.e. Adja Coef. s.e. Adja Coef. s.e. Adja Coef. s.e. Adja 
Total cash donations (WTA) or payments 
(WTP) 
-0.06 0.16   0.05** 0.02   -1.65*** 0.35   -0.72*** 0.17 
 
Instalment = 10 years 1.27 1.68 4.41 0.14 0.20 0.38 -0.10 0.51 -1.03 0.42 0.26 1.41 
Instalment = 20 years 1.85 1.61 4.99 0.10 0.19 0.34 -0.83 0.41 -1.76 0.55** 0.26 1.54 
Improved rice farming 0.52 0.44 1.05 0.55*** 0.09 1.10 -0.40 0.27 -0.81 0.45** 0.18 0.91 
Permit 1ha 0.25 0.98 2.95 0.79*** 0.28 2.75 -1.50*** 0.48 -5.53 0.87** 0.43 3.11 
Open forest frontier  2.45** 2.01 5.15 -0.39 0.46 1.96 -2.54*** 0.76 -6.56 1.37** 0.59 3.61 
ASC (reference level alternative) 1.27 0.97   -1.03*** 0.35   -1.68*** 0.62   -0.65 0.40  
Segment size (%) 14%   86%   53%   47%   
  Explanatory variables of class probability   
  Coef. s.e.   Coef. s.e.   Coef. s.e.   Coef. s.e.   
Constant 0.84 2.02   Fixed   3.66*** 1.39   Fixed  
Food security -0.11 0.32   Fixed   -0.22* 0.08   Fixed  
Betsimisaraka 0.10 0.90   Fixed   1.05* 0.56   Fixed  
Attitude scale -0.10* 0.09   Fixed   -0.19* 0.08   Fixed  
Perception of ecological services -1.47** 0.68   Fixed   -0.18 0.55   Fixed  
Belief in the legitimacy of state’s 
conservation policy 
-0.13 0.78   Fixed   -2.02*** 0.68   Fixed   
Log-likelihood -451.87 -491.93 
McFadden’s pseudo R2 0.33 0.26 
AIC/n 1.53 1.68 
Obs. 612 606 
Note: ***, **, *  Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, a Adjusted marginal utility gains from the base level situation for the effects-coded attributes. 
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Appendix A: Interviewees' socio-economic and attitudinal characteristics 
ID Format Segment 
Betsimis
araka 
Food 
security 
(months) 
Literate 
Household 
head age 
Trust in 
payment 
vehicle 
Plausibility 
of the 
scenarios 
Consequentiality 
of the DCE 
survey 
Ability to negotiate 
compensations with 
the government 
Perception of the 
benefits of forest 
protection 
Belief in the 
legitimacy of forest 
conservation policy 
  1=‘strongly disagree’, 2=‘disagree’, 3= ‘neither disagree nor  agree’, 4=‘agree’, 5=‘strongly agree’ 
I1 WTA Trader Yes 12 No 21 3 3 3 2 1 1 
I2 WTA Non-trader Yes 7 No 40 1 1 1 1 0 0 
I3 WTA Trader No 8 Yes 45 3 5 4 1 1 0 
I4 WTA Trader Yes 12 Yes 46 2 4 5 3 1 0 
I5 WTA Trader No 10 No 38 3 1 4 1 1 0 
I6 WTA Non-trader Yes 4 No 21 4 4 4 3 0 0 
I7 WTA Trader Yes 6 No 20 3 4 4 2 1 0 
I8 WTA Trader No 8 Yes 45 5 4 5 1 1 0 
I9 WTA Trader Yes 10 Yes 37 3 4 3 3 1 0 
I10 WTA Trader Yes 5 Yes 30 1 3 1 2 1 1 
I11 WTA Trader Yes 6 Yes 60 3 3 3 3 1 0 
I12 WTP Trader No 12 Yes 32 1 3 2 3 1 0 
I13 WTP Trader No 7 Yes 27 4 3 4 3 1 0 
I14 WTP Non-trader Yes 5 Yes 51 4 2 5 4 1 0 
I15 WTP Non-trader No 5 Yes 23 2 1 3 1 1 0 
I16 WTP Non-trader No 3 Yes 52 1 1 5 2 1 0 
I17 WTP Trader Yes 9 Yes 38 4 5 3 4 0 0 
I18 WTP Trader Yes 12 No 74 2 3 4 3 1 0 
I19 WTP Trader Yes 7 Yes 52 2 3 1 1 0 1 
I20 WTP Non-trader Yes 3 Yes 52 1 1 5 1 1 0 
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Appendix B: Respondents’ socio-economic characteristics 
 
Descriptive statistics of socio-economic variables 
WTA sample 
 (N = 102) 
WTP sample 
 (N = 104) t-value 
a  
χ2(1) b  
z-value c  
p-value 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev 
Mean Std. Dev 
a Household head's age (years) 38.87 14.56 37.36 13.51 .519 a .60 
a Household size 5.79 2.42 6.07 2.71 -.790 a 0.43 
a Quantity of seeds used in the swidden agricultural plots (in kapoaka - as a proxy of land holding) 208.91 198.27 238.62 201.0 -.960  a .513* 
b Access to at least one of the plots is by inheritance 1=YES; 0=NO 0.31 0.46 0.29 0.41 .652 b .545 
b Access to at least one of the plots is by forest clearance 1=YES; 0=NO 0.41 0.49 0.42 0.38 .546 b .725 
a Total livestock owned by the household (in tropical livestock unit - Chilonda and Otte 2006)  0.76 1.80 0.95 2.04 -.704 a .482 
c Food security (number of months that the household has enough to eat) 5.87 3.13 6.15 3.21 -.575 c .565 
a Education: Years of official schooling of the household head 2.15 2.78 2.24 2.53 -.269 a .78 
b Literacy indicating whether the household head is literate 1=YES; 0=NO 0.51 0.50 0.64 0.48 2.719 b .084* 
b Immigration status: Has the household moved to the village within the last 10 years? 1=YES; 0=NO 0.44 0.49 0.32 0.47 2.609 b .102 
b Ethnicity = Betsimisaraka  1=YES; 0=NO 0.79 0.40 0.66 0.47 3.392 b .056* 
b Has the household received the World Bank safeguard development project?12 1=YES; 0=NO 0.17 0.05 0.21 0.41 .856 b .355 
c 
Do respondents have experience of the improved rice cultivation? 
3: "I have done it", 2: "I have seen it", 1: "I have heard about it", 0: "I have never 
seen nor heard about it" 
Scale 0 to 3 0.75 0.92 0.78 0.88 -.436 c .663 
(a) Mean comparison t-tests were applied to compare continuous variables between the two samples,  (b) chi-square tests were used to compare the 
distributions of binary variables  and (c) Mann-Whitney-U tests for ranked variables. Note: ***, ** ,*  Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
                                                          
12 These safeguards projects were implemented in 2013 and were intended to compensate for the negative impacts of the Ankeniheny-Zahamena REDD+ pilot project (see 
Poudyal et al. 2016). 
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Appendix C: Choice experiment survey in practice 
In practice, we used dolls and large pictures to help respondents engage with the survey and 
framed it as a game to desensitize the illegal nature of forest clearance (an approach used by 
Nielsen and colleagues, (2014) when valuing illegal bushmeat hunting in Tanzania). The full 
survey took one to two hours per household with some warm-up steps to give respondents some 
practice and ensure they understood the task of making trade-offs in a DCE survey. The 
position of the reference level alternative within each choice card was shuffled to motivate 
respondents to engage in compensatory decision making (i.e. to trade-off attributes and levels 
across alternatives instead of simply anchoring on the position of the reference option). 
 
 
